Labour's game plan for a Commons majority, to win people and places that were not already onside, was executed to perfection when reaching out.
By Sunder KatwalaJul 09, 2024
“Change”. That was what this election was about. Change, above all, from Rishi Sunak’s Conservative party. Fourteen million voted Conservative last time. Fewer than seven million did this time. The Conservatives lost a quarter of the vote to Reform on the right and another quarter to their left. The losses on either flank were enough for Sunak to lose power on their own. The combination was devastating. When it came to seats, the Conservatives lost a handful to the Greens and Reform – while many were swept away by the Lib Dems and Labour.
Labour won a crushing, yet curious victory. This 1997-style landslide of 412 seats was won on the lowest turnout since 2001 and a lower vote share than in 2005, or for any previous winning government. The new electoral map suggests Labour has a “coalition of everywhere” – making sweeping gains across Scotland, winning back every ‘Red Wall’ seat lost in 2019, having the most seats in every region and making once-in-a-century gains in Cheshire, Somerset and Norfolk.
Labour’s game plan for a Commons majority, to win people and places that were not already onside, was executed to perfection when reaching out. But the message – that the party was prioritising people and places who do not habitually vote Labour – was also heard by those who normally do.
Bristol Central ousted Labour to strengthen the Green voice – offering a cosmopolitan counterblast to Nigel Farage’s insurgency in Clacton on the Essex coast. Islington North chose to keep Jeremy Corbyn in parliament. Labour’s support was down among the under 40s, generally, but it fell most of all, by an average of 20 per cent, in constituencies where most voters are not white.
Most black voters still voted Labour, on a reduced turnout. But 2024 was the first modern general election when most British Asian voters did not vote Labour. Focaldata’s ‘How Britain voted’ analysis estimates that Labour averaged 43 per cent across Asian voters as a whole, with the Conservatives on 20 per cent, and around one in 10 for each of the Lib Dems (nine per cent), Greens (11 per cent) and independents (10 per cent). Voting patterns and the reasons for voters’ choices will clearly differ across different groups and generations.
Sir Keir Starmer’s party lost around half a million Muslim voters – usually to its left – as the ‘Gaza effect’ outstripped that after Iraq in 2005. Alongside Corbyn in Islington, Labour lost four more seats to independents in Birmingham, Blackburn, Dewsbury and Leicester South, all constituencies with large Muslim electorates. Yet the party still holds 46 of the 50 constituencies with the largest Muslim populations, as it held all of its east London seats, on reduced majorities, and gained three more, removing George Galloway in Rochdale and taking Peterborough and Wycombe from the Conservatives. Pro-Gaza candidates won less support in the south than in the Midlands and Yorkshire.
Meanwhile, Tory progress with Indian voters helped to make Harrow East the sole constituency in Britain where the Conservatives reached 50 per cent. The Church of England was once called ‘the Tory party at prayer’, but the Hindu temples of Harrow might now contest that title. There was even one Tory gain in Leicester East, on a night of 250 losses, as Shivani Raja, not yet 30, defeated both her Labour opponent and the constituency’s previous two Labour MPs. Keith Vaz came fifth with under 4,000 votes. Most Leicester voters found their veteran MP of three decades an unlikely champion of change.
Beyond Harrow and Leicester, Labour still holds 26 of the 28 Westminster constituencies where most voters are Asian. Its strong parliamentary presence offers Labour MPs opportunities to reconnect – but a governing party will struggle unless it roots those efforts with voters from specific groups in a more coherent approach to engage fairly and effectively in a diverse democracy with citizens from all minority and majority groups at the same time.
Sunder Katwala
There is more change in the Commons than ever before - 335 first-time MPs and 15 retreads outnumber the 300 re-elected incumbents. With 90 ethnic minority MPs, it is the first time the House of Commons reflects the diversity of the electorate. But there is less ethnic diversity in the Starmer government than in recent Tory administrations, with three ethnic minority ministers around the Cabinet table – David Lammy, Shabana Mahmood and Lisa Nandy – but nobody among the ministers of state, demonstrating a weak Labour pipeline from its strong parliamentary representation to bigger leadership roles.
The test of this new government will be delivering change. The Rwanda scheme was scrapped on day one. It has a mandate to build – favouring YIMBYS over NIMBYS – and promises to focus on growth, the NHS, energy and breaking down barriers to opportunity.
Labour should govern for its new “coalition of everywhere” – but the election tactics of the opposition made some people and places more equal than others. It will be important to rebalance that in government: a decade of national renewal depends on ensuring that everywhere really does mean everywhere.
"If liberty means anything at all, it is the right to tell people what they do not want to hear”. George Orwell’s quote is emblazoned by his statue outside BBC Broadcasting House. Last week, the question inside was this: has Britain given up on free speech?
That is the free speech debate which American populist right wants to project onto Britain. US vice-president JD Vance has declared a free speech crisis here. Universities often find themselves at the epicentre of cultural clashes over free speech too. So, I also took part this week in the Oxford vice-chancellor’s Sheldonian Series debate on “cancel culture”, an exercise in promoting free speech via an open inquiry into its scope and limits.
How Americans think about free speech is enshrined in the very first amendment of their Constitution, pledging “no law abridging the freedom of speech”. Toby Young of the Free Speech Union told the Oxford audience he champions the American model for Britain too. “I would draw the line where the framers of the American constitution drew it, which is everything is acceptable within the law providing it is not a direct incitement to violence”.
My counter-proposal was that we could find more common ground on free speech in Britain by taking a different approach to America.
How far do we need to draw a line between free speech and hate speech? The US doctrine tries to duck that. It is not what you say; just whether how you say it involves violent threats. That US standard offers constitutional protection for racist, homophobic and misogynistic slurs. Research shows that most people in Britain would strike a different balance to that.
The most inarticulate form of speech I have heard was ‘monkey chanting’ at black footballers. Using ape noises as a racist caricature did not directly advocate violence, but fans of my generation also benefited from its cancellation. Young felt it was over the top to ban monkey chanting by law, suggesting racist fans were often persuaded to desist before they risked the sanction of being thrown out. My own recollection is that much of the culture shift followed a couple of years after those legal changes of 1991. But was any worthwhile free expression really curtailed?
In the UK, directing slurs at individuals is racially aggravated abuse. Yet racist statements into the ether are generally lawful speech, unless their specific context means they stir up hatred, harass, or unlawfully discriminate. Contested practical debates about policing - over asylum or abortion, Israeli and Palestine – are often about conditions on where and when protest happens and can protect legitimate protest rights alongside those of others to study, work or worship without intimidation.
I feel little interest in the police debate over whether or how to record ‘non-crime incidents’ - but much more in the failure to effectively police or regulate incessant unlawful racial hatred. A new culture of impunity for racist abuse is having toxic cultural consequences, online and offline. That curbs the speech of those targeted too.
The Office for Students’ will not protect holocaust denial under any circumstances. The Free Speech Union supports that. This shows how holocaust denial is often treated as a one-off case, conceded, perhaps tactically, by those who habitually argue for protecting all lawful speech. Yet this example could be used more productively to illuminate key broader principles about boundaries. The European Court of Human Rights allows states to outlaw holocaust denial. The UK has not passed similar laws to Germany and Austria, though institutions have legitimate reasons to exclude it. The Free Speech Union explained that holocaust denial is excluded from ECHR protection “because it runs counter to the values of the Convention itself”. This is to defend free speech as a qualified right: protected for those who respect the rights of others. That is clearly incompatible with the US constitutional approach, but aligns much better with British social norms.
Where next on free speech? Young worried that the politicised weaponisation of institutional processes can often feel punitive, whatever the final decision. But how far will new laws and processes alleviate or exacerbate those risks? Guardian columnist Zoe Williams emphasised how rife inconsistency can be in free speech debates. The US administration stretches free speech hypocrisy to new heights, lecturing the British even while cleansing library shelves and websites of any mention of inclusion or diversity.
Helen Mountfield KC, principal of Mansfield College, argued for consistency too - “free speech for me and thee”. She proposed that demonstrating that academic freedom and free speech were alive and well in universities should also enable a shift of focus: to pay more attention to equal opportunities to speak freely, and the value of listening to a plurality of views. ‘Cancel culture’ debates have provided the sharp edges of the so-called culture wars. It may now be time to put as much energy into ‘calling in’ as ‘calling out’ - to model how to actively promote practical cultures of free speech in polarising times.
Sunder Katwala is the director of thinktank British Future and the author of the book How to Be a Patriot: The must-read book on British national identity and immigration.
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