Can Israel's planned oil pipeline help Gulf states bypass Hormuz and bring them closer?

• Israel has proposed a roughly 700 km pipeline linking Saudi Arabia to Eilat.
• The route could connect to an existing 254 km pipeline from Eilat to Ashkelon.
• The idea could reduce reliance on Hormuz, but it is not yet an agreed Saudi-Israel project.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producers are looking for ways to keep their exports moving when the region's main shipping routes become dangerous. One idea now being pushed by Israel is a new Saudi-to-Israel oil pipeline that could eventually allow Gulf crude to reach Europe without relying as heavily on the Strait of Hormuz or the most exposed Red Sea shipping routes.

The proposal, put forward by Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen, involves building a roughly 700 km pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Eilat. From there, crude could enter Israel's existing Trans-Israel pipeline and travel to Ashkelon on the Mediterranean coast before being loaded on to tankers for European markets. Reuters reported that Cohen had presented the idea to the US.

It is important to stress that this is still a proposal. There is no agreed Saudi-Israel pipeline project, and Saudi Arabia has not publicly committed to using the route.

But the idea is gaining attention because the problem it is trying to solve is becoming harder for Gulf producers to ignore.

The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world's most important oil chokepoints. Around a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments passed through the waterway before the current disruption, while attacks and security risks have also made shipping through the Red Sea more difficult. Reuters reported on August 9 that uncertainty remained over when Hormuz would fully reopen.

For Saudi Arabia, there is already an alternative of sorts. Its East-West pipeline carries crude from the country's oil-producing east to Yanbu on the Red Sea, allowing some exports to avoid Hormuz.

But getting that oil from Yanbu to European buyers still involves maritime transport. The proposed Israeli route would take the crude north from the Red Sea to Eilat, where it could be transferred to the existing Israeli pipeline system.

That is where an old piece of infrastructure suddenly becomes relevant.

An old pipeline gets a new role

The existing Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline was established in 1968. The 254 km, 42-inch pipeline connects Israel's Red Sea port at Eilat with its Mediterranean port at Ashkelon. The operator, Europe Asia Pipeline Company, says the system can move crude in both directions and has a maximum capacity of 60 million tonnes a year in its main direction.

Its history is particularly unusual.

The pipeline was created when Israel and Iran, then ruled by the Shah, had a very different relationship. It was designed as a land bridge for oil moving between the Red Sea and Mediterranean, allowing crude from the Gulf to reach Europe without passing through the Suez Canal. The Iranian revolution of 1979 transformed that relationship completely.

Almost six decades later, Israel is suggesting that the same infrastructure could help carry Saudi crude.

Under the proposed arrangement, Saudi oil would first move through the Kingdom's existing pipeline network towards the Red Sea. From Yanbu, it could travel by tanker to Eilat before entering the Israeli pipeline and continuing to Ashkelon.

The existing pipeline's northbound capacity is estimated at around 1.2 million barrels a day, although analysts caution that this would represent only a fraction of Saudi Arabia's overall exports. An analysis cited by NDTV estimated Saudi crude exports at roughly 6 million to 7.5 million barrels a day, meaning even full use of the Israeli route would handle only a relatively small share.

That is why the proposal is better understood as an additional escape route rather than a replacement for Hormuz.

Energy consultancy Vortexa's Claire Jungman reportedly described pipelines as a "pressure valve", rather than a substitute for the Gulf's tanker network. She said crude flows through Hormuz had fallen sharply during the disruption and that existing pipeline alternatives were filling only part of the gap.

There is also another established alternative. The SUMED pipeline carries crude across Egypt from the Red Sea towards the Mediterranean and has a reported maximum capacity of around 2.5 million barrels a day. Saudi Aramco and other Gulf producers already have interests in the system.

So the Israeli route would be competing with or complementing existing infrastructure rather than replacing it.

And that raises the more interesting question: why is Israel pushing the idea now?

For Israel, a Saudi pipeline would mean more than transit fees. It could make the country a more important part of the Gulf-to-Europe energy network and give its existing infrastructure a larger strategic role.

Cohen reportedly said Gulf countries did not want to depend on Iran or the Houthis for their oil exports and argued that a land route through Israel could bypass both threats.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has also spoken publicly about the possibility of using pipelines across the Arabian Peninsula and Israel to avoid the region's maritime chokepoints.

But the biggest obstacle is not the engineering. It is Saudi Arabia.

Could oil create a bridge where politics cannot?

Saudi Arabia and Israel do not have formal diplomatic relations. Riyadh has continued to link normalisation with progress towards Palestinian statehood, while Israel has rejected the creation of a Palestinian state in its current form.

That makes a major shared energy project politically difficult.

Yet energy has already created some unusual links between Israel and other Gulf states.

Israel has become a regional natural gas exporter after developing major offshore fields. Mubadala Energy, the United Arab Emirates' sovereign wealth arm, invested about £750 million in Israel's Tamar gas field, creating a direct financial connection between Gulf capital and Israeli energy infrastructure.

Egypt and Jordan also receive Israeli gas, showing that energy relationships can develop even in a region where political ties remain complicated.

Saudi Arabia would be a much bigger step.

A pipeline connecting Saudi oil to Israeli infrastructure could create a relationship based on a very practical interest: keeping energy exports moving. It could also give Riyadh another option if Hormuz or Red Sea routes become unreliable.

But it would expose Saudi oil to a different set of risks.

The Israeli pipeline itself is not immune to attacks. Eilat and Ashkelon have faced missile and drone threats during regional conflicts, while Ashkelon is close to Gaza. The pipeline is therefore not a magic route that makes the security problem disappear. It simply moves part of the risk from the sea to infrastructure on land.

Energy analysts have also warned against treating pipelines as fail-safe systems. Michael Carolan of Argus Media reportedly said diversification was sensible because the recent conflict had demonstrated the danger of relying on a single export route. But he also cautioned that pipelines, storage facilities and production sites can themselves become targets.

That may be the most important limitation of the proposal.

A tanker can change course. A pipeline cannot.

The proposed Saudi-Israel link would therefore give Gulf producers another option, but it would not remove their dependence on the wider energy transport network.

And there is another reason the idea matters beyond oil.

If Saudi Arabia were eventually to use Israeli infrastructure to send crude to Europe, the economic relationship between the two countries would become much harder to separate from their wider geopolitical relationship.

That does not mean a pipeline would bring peace to the Middle East. There is no evidence yet that such a project could overcome the major political disputes between Riyadh and Jerusalem.

But infrastructure can create interests that did not previously exist.

A Saudi-Israel oil route would mean Saudi crude moving through Israeli territory, Israeli ports becoming more important to Gulf energy exports and both sides having a financial interest in keeping that connection operating.

For now, however, the proposal remains just that: a proposal.

Saudi Arabia is also looking at expanding its own western pipeline capacity, while existing routes through Yanbu, Egypt and the wider tanker network remain central to Gulf exports. Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia was considering increasing the capacity of its crude pipeline to the western Red Sea coast.

The Israeli idea may therefore be less about replacing Hormuz than about making sure Gulf producers have more than one way out when the next crisis arrives.

And if that route eventually runs through Israel, the oil may end up creating an economic connection between two countries that politics has so far kept apart.