For all the shrill rhetoric immediately following Sunday’s (September 18) attack on an Indian army camp in Kashmir, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan, the threat of a sudden escalation in hostilities between the nuclear-armed rivals has receded for now.
Two days after 18 Indian soldiers were killed, in the biggest blow to security forces in the disputed Himalayan region for 14 years, some officials called for a measured response and plotted a diplomatic offensive to increase pressure on Pakistan.
Military action was limited to skirmishes near the Line of Control (LoC) separating the countries in Kashmir, with Indian troops killing eight people they said were trying to cross the de facto border and separately fighting four or five suspected militants.
Union law minister Ravi Shankar Prasad said there was a deep sense of outrage about the attack in the border town of Uri, and that patience with Pakistan was wearing thin.
But he added: “Whatever decisions the government takes in this regard will be done with full diplomatic and strategic maturity.”
Prasad also warned against loose talk of conducting cross-border strikes.
Pakistan has dismissed Indian allegations of involvement in the Uri attack, saying the administration of prime minister Narendra Modi had apportioned blame even before the investigation was complete.
Home minister Rajnath Singh on Sunday tweeted that “Pakistan is a terrorist state.”
The attack presents Modi with the most serious crisis involving Pakistan since his election in 2014, with hardliners who helped him sweep to power expecting a more robust reaction than that of the last government.
Yet the response so far resembles the path of “strategic restraint” that previous leaders have adopted, even at times of major tension including the 2008 assault on Mumbai in which 166 people were killed by gunmen who came from Pakistan.
Senior security officials on the ground in Kashmir, facing a hardening of separatist attitudes in response to the rise of Modi, say they can manage the impulsiveness of his hardcore nationalist allies.
“This country has a very robust bureaucratic set-up to take care of their inadequacies,” one senior army officer said, on condition of anonymity.
Any military action against Pakistan would be carefully weighed on its merits and against less risky alternatives such as diplomatic pressure, economic measures or covert action.
“It’s a tactical decision,” the officer said.
On Tuesday (September 20), a team from India’s National Investigative Agency gathered more evidence from Uri including blood samples, DNA and the GPS devices that the four attackers carried. The assailants were killed by the army.
Indian government officials are hoping they can establish the route they believe the gunmen took to cross the LoC from the Pakistani side, because it would help mount a diplomatic offensive against Islamabad for harbouring militants.
An official at the Indian interior ministry said the government was preparing to make a case before the United States to encourage it to take economic measures against Pakistan for failing to act against insurgents operating from its soil.
Washington has already cut back military and economic aid to Pakistan, in part because it says Islamabad did not target the Pakistan-based Haqqani militant network blamed for a widening insurgency in Afghanistan.
“You will see multiple serious action against Pakistan, the results will hurt their economy,” the Indian interior ministry official said.
One problem for Modi’s government is that, by promising an appropriate response to the attack and raising expectations of a punitive strike, officials in his administration could now lose face with its core nationalist constituency.
Another is that retaliatory measures carry a risk of a bigger conflict between India and Pakistan, who have fought three wars since independence, two of them over the
nuclear flashpoint of Kashmir.
“There are no easy options, but not doing anything is also not an option,” said an Indian defence source.
Military officials in New Delhi and Srinagar, summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, have cautioned against rushing into cross-border strikes that members of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party were baying for in the hours after the raid.
One option long on the table is a small group of soldiers carrying out a fast attack on one or two Pakistan army posts across the border that are suspected of helping militants sneak into Kashmir, the defence source said.
Another option that the Modi’s administration is seen as more likely to explore than its predecessors is targeted assassinations of leaders of militant groups based in Pakistan.
But India’s operational and intelligence capabilities to carry out such operations are unproven and carry the risk of going wrong.
“India may well decide to introduce some subtle means of punishing Pakistan into its policy toolkit,” wrote Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson Center on Indian website Rediff News.
“Forget about sending in troops or raining down missiles, but don’t rule out certain types of furtive activities, including occasional covert operations that target specific terrorist leaders or facilities.”
TENSIONS with Pakistan, fluctuating ties with Bangladesh, and growing Chinese influence in Nepal and Sri Lanka have complicated India’s neighbourhood policy, a top foreign policy and security expert has said.
C Raja Mohan, distinguished professor at the Motwani Jodeja Institute for American Studies at OP Jindal Global University, has a new book out, called India and the Rebalancing of Asia.
He also described how India’s engagement with the US, Japan, Australia and Europe has moved from symbolism to one of substance. Raja Mohan said, “After independence, India withdrew from regional security politics, focusing on global issues and non-alignment. But the past decade has seen a reversal. India is now back in the Asian balance of power. The very concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ reflects that, putting the ‘Indo’ into the ‘Pacific.’”
The idea, he explained, has deep historical roots: “The British once viewed the Indian and Pacific Oceans as interconnected realms. Now, after decades of separation, those spaces are merging again.”
Narendra Modi with Xi Jinping and (right)Vladimir Putin at last month’s SCO summit in China
While India once aspired to build a “post-Western order” alongside China, those dreams have long since faded, according to the expert.
“Contradictions between India and China have sharpened,” he said, citing territorial disputes, a $100 billion (£75bn) trade deficit, and China’s growing influence among India’s neighbours.
By contrast, India’s ties with the US and Europe have strengthened.
“Where once India shunned security cooperation with Washington, it is now deeply engaged,” he said. Yet he emphasised that India remains an independent actor, “not a traditional ally like Japan or Australia.”
His comments were made during the Adelphi series, hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) last month. According to the expert, who is also a visiting research professor at the National University of Singapore, the return of India to regional security politics marks a significant change in its foreign policy since independence. Popular discussions about the “rise of Asia” tend to oversimplify what Raja Mohan explained was a deeply uneven transformation. “It’s more accurate to say Asia as a whole is rising,” he said, adding, “but not evenly. China has risen much faster than the rest.”
This imbalance has created internal contradictions within Asia, according to the academic. “China’s sense of entitlement to regional dominance and its territorial claims have provoked reactions from other Asian countries,” he said.
While China’s economic ascent, once “a marriage of Western capital and Chinese labour”, that relationship has strained over the past 15 years as the Asian country grew into a global military and economic powerhouse, according to Raja Mohan.
And the US, which previously nurtured China’s growth, now seeks to restore balance in Asia, shifting from a policy of engagement to one of cautious competition, he said.
Dwelling on India’s rise, he said, “The question is not whether India can match China alone, but whether it can help build coalitions that limit unilateralism. History shows weaker states can play crucial balancing roles, as China once did against the Soviet Union.”
He explored how the US-China and India-China dynamics might evolve, particularly under US president Donald Trump.
“Some believe the US is retrenching to focus on Asia, others think Trump might seek a grand bargain with China,” Raja Mohan said. “Much depends on how Washington manages its ties with Russia and its global posture.”
He also described how India’s engagement with the US, Japan, Australia and Europe has moved from symbolism to one of substance. Raja Mohan said, “After independence, India withdrew from regional security politics, focusing on global issues and non-alignment. But the past decade has seen a reversal. India is now back in the Asian balance of power. The very concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ reflects that, putting the ‘Indo’ into the ‘Pacific.’”
The idea, he explained, has deep historical roots: “The British once viewed the Indian and Pacific Oceans as interconnected realms. Now, after decades of separation, those spaces are merging again.”
While India once aspired to build a “post-Western order” alongside China, those dreams have long since faded, according to the expert.
“Contradictions between India and China have sharpened,” he said, citing territorial disputes, a $100 billion (£75bn) trade deficit, and China’s growing influence among India’s neighbours.
By contrast, India’s ties with the US and Europe have strengthened.
“Where once India shunned security cooperation with Washington, it is now deeply engaged,” he said. Yet he emphasised that India remains an independent actor, “not a traditional ally like Japan or Australia.”
His comments were made during the Adelphi series, hosted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) last month. According to the expert, who is also a visiting research professor at the National University of Singapore, the return of India to regional security politics marks a significant change in its foreign policy since independence. Popular discussions about the “rise of Asia” tend to oversimplify what Raja Mohan explained was a deeply uneven transformation. “It’s more accurate to say Asia as a whole is rising,” he said, adding, “but not evenly. China has risen much faster than the rest.”
This imbalance has created internal contradictions within Asia, according to the academic. “China’s sense of entitlement to regional dominance and its territorial claims have provoked reactions from other Asian countries,” he said.
While China’s economic ascent, once “a marriage of Western capital and Chinese labour”, that relationship has strained over the past 15 years as the Asian country grew into a global military and economic powerhouse, according to Raja Mohan.
And the US, which previously nurtured China’s growth, now seeks to restore balance in Asia, shifting from a policy of engagement to one of cautious competition, he said.
Dwelling on India’s rise, he said, “The question is not whether India can match China alone, but whether it can help build coalitions that limit unilateralism. History shows weaker states can play crucial balancing roles, as China once did against the Soviet Union.”
He explored how the US-China and India-China dynamics might evolve, particularly under US president Donald Trump.
“Some believe the US is retrenching to focus on Asia, others think Trump might seek a grand bargain with China,” Raja Mohan said. “Much depends on how Washington manages its ties with Russia and its global posture.”
China, he noted, has already toned down its aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy, realising that assertiveness has backfired. Yet the underlying structural contradictions between China and both the US and India “are unlikely to disappear.”
Asked about India’s balancing act between the US and Russia, especially after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the expert was pragmatic.
“India has steadily moved closer to the US and the West, but Trump’s trade-first approach has caused turbulence,” Raja Mohan said.
He cited the threats of high tariffs on Indian imports and resentment over trade imbalances with Washington DC.
On Russia, Raja Mohan’s view was that the relationship has been “in slow decline since the 1990s.”
While India’s GDP now outpaces Russia’s, it continues to engage Moscow for practical reasons. “India’s oil purchases from Russia rose from two per cent to forty per cent after 2022. That’s pragmatism, not alignment,” Raja Mohan said.
He added that prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent handshakes with China’s president Xi Jinping and Russia’s president Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) summit in China were “signals, reminders to the West that India has options.”
Raja Mohan said India was at the cusp of a historic transformation. “India once provided security across Asia - in both world wars, millions of Indian soldiers fought overseas. That history was forgotten when India withdrew from global security,” he said.
“Now we are reclaiming that role. Ideally, the partnership with the US is the best. But if not, India and other Asian powers will have to shoulder the burden themselves.”
“Japan, Korea, India, Australia - all will have to do more on their own,” he said. “We’ll need to pull up our own bootstraps.”
Dr Benjamin Rhode, senior fellow at IISS, chaired the session.
aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomacy, realising that assertiveness has backfired. Yet the underlying structural contradictions between China and both the US and India “are unlikely to disappear.”
Asked about India’s balancing act between the US and Russia, especially after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the expert was pragmatic.
“India has steadily moved closer to the US and the West, but Trump’s trade-first approach has caused turbulence,” Raja Mohan said.
He cited the threats of high tariffs on Indian imports and resentment over trade imbalances with Washington DC.
On Russia, Raja Mohan’s view was that the relationship has been “in slow decline since the 1990s.”
While India’s GDP now outpaces Russia’s, it continues to engage Moscow for practical reasons. “India’s oil purchases from Russia rose from two per cent to forty per cent after 2022. That’s pragmatism, not alignment,” Raja Mohan said.
He added that prime minister Narendra Modi’s recent handshakes with China’s president Xi Jinping and Russia’s president Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) summit in China were “signals, reminders to the West that India has options.”
Raja Mohan said India was at the cusp of a historic transformation. “India once provided security across Asia - in both world wars, millions of Indian soldiers fought overseas. That history was forgotten when India withdrew from global security,” he said.
“Now we are reclaiming that role. Ideally, the partnership with the US is the best. But if not, India and other Asian powers will have to shoulder the burden themselves.”
“Japan, Korea, India, Australia - all will have to do more on their own,” he said. “We’ll need to pull up our own bootstraps.”
Dr Benjamin Rhode, senior fellow at IISS, chaired the session.
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