- Friday, May 03, 2024
By: Radhakrishna N S
By Professor Rana Mitter
AS BRITAIN definitively left the European Union, the government’s eyes have turned east.
Asia has a pull for Britain that comes in part from the statistics – the two most populous countries on earth, the second- and third-biggest economies in the world, and a wealth of dynamic, growing populations eager to earn and spend.
Boris Johnson plans to visit India soon, with both trade and security on his mind. His hopes for a UK-India trade deal may need to be managed – India does few trade deals and its economy is famously difficult to enter from outside. On defence, however, Johnson may have new cards to play.
One such card is an interest in joining ‘the Quad’, a grouping that brings together India, Australia, Japan, and the United States for shared defence exercises. It’s sometimes nicknamed an “Asian Nato,” but this gives too much substance to a grouping that has been marked by ambivalence among its members, and by India in particular.
Although no specific target for the alliance is ever named, there’s little doubt among observers that the Quad is aimed at curbing China’s influence. Each member has a somewhat different aim. For Australia, its recent experience of being bruised by an undeclared trade war has been the latest realisation that its heavy dependence on China’s economy brings not just prosperity, but also vulnerability. Japan is increasingly concerned by Chinese military assertiveness in the East China Sea. The US is starting to see China as an existential opponent. And India is increasingly concerned by the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, as well its extensive investment in neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Yet India and Japan have contented themselves with fairly minimal military outreach in the postwar era – India by Nehruvian inclination, and Japan as a consequence of its militaristic past which led to a “peace constitution” being imposed on it. The shift to a more confrontational posture brings its own set of hard-to-calculate scenarios.
British foreign secretary Dominic Raab has confirmed the UK is considering joining the Quad, encouraged by US president Joe Biden and secretary of state Tony Blinken. The UK will have only two aircraft carriers (the second coming into operation in 2023) and doesn’t have the capacity to maintain a permanent Pacific presence. Therefore, its gesture is more of a clarification that it shares the agenda rapidly building around China among its neighbours and in Washington – that Beijing’s ambitions are increasingly worrying for the rest of the world.
Yet, this policy will have consequences. Notably, Britain (like India, but unlike the US, Australia and Japan) currently has no formal trade agreement with China. Heightened security cooperation in the Quad might mean that the chances of such a deal lessen further as Beijing reacts angrily. Of course, it could be a perfectly valid decision that security interests outweigh potential market gains. Although China has the second-biggest economy in the world, Australia’s example shows that access to it can come with a hefty price. Yet it is also a big gesture for a major economy which has detached itself from an integrated single market on its doorstep to take a bet, in effect, that placing security over trade with China is the right call for the next 20 years.
The interest in the Quad echoes the recent announcement that the UK has also applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Asian trade agreement which includes neither China nor the US, but does bring together a range of dynamic Pacific economies. Most analysts suggest that the overall effect of any such deal will be small, but a formal commitment does give a sense that the UK is serious about committing to the Asia-Pacific region.
But Britain is in danger of making a fundamental error if it thinks that it can deepen its relationship with Asia as an alternative to creating a new and deep relationship with Europe. After all, one of the primary attractions of Britain before 2016 for many Asian countries – China and India included – was as an easy route into the single market.
On defence issues too, it will simply not be possible for the UK to ignore its European neighbours. Some ministers might imply that there is little connection between NATO and the EU, but they have more connections than just their co-location in Brussels. While the E3 grouping (UK, France and Germany) has significance, it cannot simply be separated from the European security context, not least because so much of European thinking in the near future will be about how to balance trade and security opportunities and concerns with China.
When it comes to defence, climate change, trade, and values, Britain will have long and sometimes very difficult conversations to come with India, China, the EU, and the US. It will need to coordinate those conversations, and urgently.
Rana Mitter is a professor of the history and politics of modern China, University of Oxford; and vice-president-elect (communications) at the British Academy. His new book, China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism (Harvard University Press), is out now. He won an Eastern Eye ACTA for Best Presenter in 2019 for his BBC Radio 4 series, Chinese Characters.
